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Comments
THE WRIT OF SEQUESTRATION IN LOUISIANA*
Sequestration is one of the five conservatory writs designed
to preserve the res of the suit in its status quo until definitive
judgment. Being a simple conservatory measure, it confers no
rights which did not exist before the sequestration,' nor does it
create a lien or privilege on the property sequestered.2 All kinds
of property may be sequestered, whether real or personal, 3 includ-
ing obligations and titles,4 and the revenues therefrom during the
sequestration.5 That property is perishable furnishes no obstacle
to its sequestration.6
There are two types of sequestration; judicial, where the judge
issues the writ on his own motion; and legal (or conventional),
where the writ is granted at the request of one of the parties. 7 The
order granting or refusing the writ is an interlocutory one, and
hence is not appealable unless irreparable injury will result.8 The
trial court can issue the writ at any time during the suit, even
though an appeal has been perfected, as long as it does not effect
the matter as submitted to the appellate court." The granting of
a judicial sequestration being a matter of trial court discretion,
* Statute and code articles herein cited have been abbreviated and modi-
fied for the purposes of clarification.
1. Bank of Alabama v. Hozey, 2 Rob. 150 (La 1842).
2. Art. 724, La. Code of Practice of 1870: ". . . sequestration give[s] no
privilege to those (who obtain the writ), until they have obtained a judg-
ment and order of execution on the property sequestered." The writ does not
become functus officio when the judgment is rendered in the cause in which
it is issued or when such judgment becomes executory, and, if maintained,
holds the property sequestered in order that said judgment may be executed.
Jennings-Heywood Oil Syn. v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 117 La. 960, 42 So.
467 (1906).
3. Art. 271, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
4. Art. 272, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
5. Supra note 3.
6. As to the proper procedure when perishable property is sequestered,
see infra note 118.
7. Arts. 273 and 274, La. Code of Practice of 1870; see also Art. 2979, La.
Civil Code of 1870. Although the term "conventional" has crept into ourjurisprudence in describing this type of sequestration, the term "legal" is
preferable. "Conventional sequestration" implies that the writ issues as a
result of some convention between the parties, whereas the defendant never
actually consents to it. The plaintiff is entitled to it by effect of law, not as a
result of contract.
8. Schwan v. Schwan, 52 La. Ann. 1183, 27 So. 678 (1900).
9. McFarlane v. Richardson, 1 La. Ann. 12 (1846); State ex rel. Jennings-
Heywood Oil Syn. v. De Baillon, 113 La. 572, 37 So. 481 (1904).
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mandamus and prohibition will not lie to compel the judge to
grant or refuse the sequestration writ, nor to continue or discon-
tinue it.1°
Since sequestration is only an accessory proceeding, 1 the dis-
missal of the suit effects the dissolution of the sequestration.12
This should not be an ex parte dismissal,"3 however, for the pur-
pose of the writ is to hold the property until some definitive judg-
ment is rendered. The defendant in the sequestration proceeding,
whether in the first instance or on appeal, may be cited either in
the jurisdiction where the property is situated or found,14 or in
the jurisdiction of his domicile, as the plaintiff chooses. 5
When the property has been brought into the custody of one
court, no other court may sequester it. The New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure make the Louisiana writ of sequestration avail-
able to litigants in the federal courts of Louisiana, regardless of
whether the action was lodged in the federal court originally, or
removed there. 6 Hence where the federal court sequesters the
property, it is no longer subject to a writ from a state court. 7
Sequestration may be granted in chambers by the judge. 8
Where a judge issues the writ on his own motion, he may do so
without a hearing of the parties, provided he predicate his action
on all of the pleadings and circumstances alleged by the parties. 9
Clerks of district courts, outside of Orleans Parish, also may issue
the writ, but it would seem that this power would be limited to
10. State ex rel. Knighton v. Derryberry, 188 La. 412, 177 So. 256 (1937).
11. A court should, of course, have jurisdiction over the principal demand
to issue the accessory writ. Bradley v. Woodruff, 26 La. Ann. 299 (1874);
Gay v. Eaton, 27 La. Ann. 166 (1875).
12. Watkinson v. Black, 14 La. 351 (1840).
13. Allen v. Allen, 165 La. 437, 115 So. 648 (1928).
14. Art. 163 of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870, as amended and
reenacted by La. Act 64 of 1876, contains the following provision as to in
rem proceedings: "provided, that all judgments rendered in such cases shall
only be operative up to the value of the property proceeded against, and not
binding for any excess over the value of the property in personam against
the defendant." Compare Franek v. Turner, 164 La. 532, 114 So. 148 (1927).
15. Art. 163, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
16. Rule 64, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts. See
Flory and McMahon, The New Federal Rules and Louisiana Practice (1938)
1 LOUISiANA LAW REVIsw 45, 76.
17. Gest & Atkinson v. New Orleans, St. Louis,. and Chicago Ry., 30 La.
Ann. 28 (1878).
18. Art. 130.1, Dart's La. Code of Practice (1942); La. Rev. Stats. of 1870,
§ 1936.
19. Ludwig v. Calloway, 191 La. 1000, 187 So. 4 (1939). But see Dickinson
v. Texana Oil Co., 144 La. 489, 80 So. 699 (1919), where the writ was set aside
because the trial judge based his action solely dn the allegations of the plain-
tiff's petition, without considering the other party's pleadings.
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cases of legal sequestration only. 0 In all cases coming within the
concurrent jurisdiction of district courts and justice of the peace
courts, when suit Is filed in a district court, the order of seques-
tration may be granted by the judge, clerk, or chief deputy clerk
thereof. 1
The Plaintiff's Affidavit and Sequestration Bond
In order to obtain the legal sequestration, the plaintiff must
annex to the petition in which he prays for the writ an affidavit
setting forth the cause for which the sequestration is claimed.22
This presupposes that the affidavit is to be made by the plaintiff
himself; and, where the plaintiff is present and no proper cause
is shown for his not making the affidavit, the oath of his agent is
not sufficient to authorize the writ's issuance. 23 The plaintiff
should state some particular ground of apprehension in those
cases where he apprehends that the property will be disposed of
to his prejudice, or at least bring his case within the words of the
code and allege that he has good ground.24 However, the words
to be used in the affidavit are not sacramental. 25
As a general rule the granting of the order of sequestration
follows the filing of the petition in the suit, but Article 276 of the
Louisiana Code of Practice authorizes the granting of the writ be-
fore the filing of the petition in the cases specified in Article 237.
In such cases it is necessary that the plaintiff or his attorney (1)
has made affidavit and given bond, (2) filed same in the court,
and (3) obtained the judge's order for issuance of the writ. Then
it is the clerk's duty to issue the writ without any petition being
presented, and the sheriff will immediately execute the process.
This apparently refers to legal sequestration only; also this pro-
cedure seems available only when the judge himself grants the
order. The usual'petition, however, must be filed on the day fol-
lowing that on which the writ is issued, unless a legal holiday is
the next day. In the latter case the petition should be filed on the
day next succeeding the day of public rest.26 As to whether the
plaintiff or his attorney should file the petition for the writ with
the clerk before presenting it to the judge for the order required,
20. Art. 783.1, Dart's La. Code of Practice (1942); La. Act 204 of 1924, § 1.
21. Art. 145.37, Dart's La. Code of Practice (1942); La. Act 223 of 1928,
§8.
22. Art. 276, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
23. Hawley v. Tarbe, 14 La. 92 (1839).
24. Leavenworth v. Plunkett, 7 La. 341 (1834).
25. Levy v. Goldberg, 1 Orl. App. 311 (1904).
26. Art. 237, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 14 of 1880.
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it has been held that such prior filing is not a condition precedent
to the signing of the order for the issuance of the writ.7
Besides the affidavit and the petition for the writ, the plaintiff
in the sequestration proceeding must execute a bond in favor of
the defendant, with the surety of one solvent person residing
within the jurisdiction.2 8 This is to discourage the improper use
of such a harsh remedy as sequestration, and to afford relief to
the defendant in the writ in case it is found that the sequestration
has been.wrongfully obtained.2 9 The amount of the bond is a mat-
ter of judicial discretion, except where revenue producing real
property is sequestered. 0 In that case the judge must require a
bond sufficient in amount to compensate the defendant for all
damage he may sustain, plus the deprivation of the revenues of
the property during the suit.3 1 The only case in which the plain-
tiff is not required to give a sequestration bond is where the de-
fendant has been judicially declared insolvent; 12 and this, even
though the property sequestered be revenue producing realty.83
To hold the plaintiff and his surety on the bond for the
wrongful issuance or the illegal obtaining of the writ, the defend-
ant should show that the writ issued when the plaintiff was not
entitled to it under the law.34 Thus, where a plaintiff attempted to
sequester an immovable under Article 275 (8) (which applies only
to movables), damages were allowed.3 5 In this way a defendant
may recover for all damages he sustained from the illegal seques-
tration, including such items as his attorney's fees and damage to
his reputation.8 But where the writ was dissolved because of
27. Zion Mercantile Co. v. Pierce, 163 La. 477, 112 So. 371 (1927). The
court held it to be the mandatory duty of the judge to sign the order when
presented with proper affidavit and bond. The fact that costs had not been
paid was not grounds for refusing to sign the order-it was with the clerk
to raise that matter when he was called upon to file and issue the process.
28. Art. 276, La. Code of Practice of 1870. The plaintiff in forma pauperis
seems unexcused from furnishing this bond. See Cadwallader, Civil Suits in
Forma Pauperis (1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW RviEsw 787, 793. See also Orgeron
v. Lytle, 180 La. 646, 157 So.' 377 (1934).
29. Ibid.
30. Art. 277, La. Code of Practice of 1870. See Mississippi Valley Trans-
port Co. v. Fosdick, Man. Unrep. Cases 3 (1877).
31. Art. 277, La. Code of Practice 'of 1870.
32. See State ex rel. Hyman v. Lewis, 42 La. Ann. 847, 8 So. 602 (1890).
33. Art. 278, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
34. The defendant may in the same suit by reconventional demand re-
cover from plaintiff damages sustained from illegal resort to the writ. Art.
375, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 50 of 1886.
35. Dixon v. Alford, 143 So. 679 (La. App. 1932).
36. American Hoist and Derrick Co. v. Frey, 127 La. 183, 53 So. 486 (1910).
Cf. General Finance Co. v. Veith, 184 So. 364 (La. App. 1938). In Dixon
v. Alford, 143 So. 679 (La. App. 1932), the court refused to allow as an element
of damage defendant's expenses for transportation to the parish seat to de-
fend the suit.
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plaintiff's failure to comply with one of the formalities of its issu-
ance, and it appeared that he was entitled to it under the law, no
damages were allowed.3 7 And, if the dissolution of the writ takes
place after hearing on the merits of the case, so that it is impos-
sible to differentiate between attorney's fees for dissolving the
writ and those for defending the suit, no allowance for damages
will be made on this count, for to do so would in effect be to allow
recovery of fees for defending the suit, which is not permissible.38
Grounds for Issuance of the Writ
In judicial sequestration, the court may on its own motion
issue the writ where the ownership of property is in dispute and
where neither party has a more apparent right to possession than
the other.39 This apparently is confined to real property by the
terms of the code article.40 In such cases the judge may continue
the writ until the question of ownership has been decided. A
previous request that the property be legally sequestered does not
affect the court's power thereafter to sequester the property judi-
cially.4'1 Only the judge can sequester judicially, even though
court clerks may in some instances sequester legally.42 Perhaps
the most common instance of judicial sequestration is where a
suit is instituted for the partition of property held jointly in in-
division, or property held by a partnership.43
Sequestration is a harsh remedy, and can only be resorted to
in those cases authorized by the very letter of the law.44 Thus
legal sequestration is limited to eight situations set forth in Ar-
ticle 275 of the Code of Practice:
(1) Where one who has possessed for over one year, and who
has been evicted through violence, sues to be restored to his pos-
session. 45 This has been held to refer to the possession of real
37. Barry v. Union Sulphur Co., 167 La. 227, 119 So. 30 (1928). See also
Donohoe Oil and Gas Co. v. Mack-Jourden Co., 144 So. 169 (La. App. 1932).
38. Fariss v. Swift, 156 La. 12, 99 So. 893 (1924); Smith v. W. D. Keith
Motors Co., 163 La. 395, 111 So. 798 (1927).
39. Art. 274, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
40. Ibid.
41. Allen, West, & Bush v. Whetstone, 35 La. Ann. 846 (1883).
42. Supra notes 20 and 21.
43. Blanchard v. Luce, 19 La. Ann. 46 (1867); Interstate Land Co. v. Doyle,
120 La. 46, 44 So. 918 (1907). Legal sequestration would be used to bring
into the custody of the court movable property held in indivision. See Segur
v. Sorel, 11,La. 439 (1837).
44. James Beck & Co. v. Brady, 6 La. Ann. 444 (1851).
45. Art. 275(1), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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property.'8 It is absolutely necessary to allege that the eviction
was through violence.
4 7
(2) Where one sues for the possession of a movable, and
fears that the party having possession may send such property
out of the court's jurisdiction during the pendency of the suit.' 8 A
request for possession and a refusal are sufficient to arouse a fear
that the property will be sent out of the jurisdiction.49  The pro-
pinquity of the property to the border of another state is an ele-
ment to be considered in estimating the strength of his apprehen-
sion.50 The question for the court is not whether the defendant
intended to remove the property out of the jurisdiction, but
whether his acts were such that the plaintiff might apprehend the
existence of an intention to so remove.5 ' Although Article 275 (2)
of the Code of Practice states the removal to be "out of the juris-
diction of the court," it seems tacitly accepted that this phrase is
intended to mean a removal out of the state.
(3) Where one claims the ownership or possession of real
property, and has good ground to apprehend that the defendant
may make use of his possession to waste the fruits and revenues
of the property, or convert them to his own use.52 The question
before the court would again be whether the acts of the defend-
ant were such as to induce the plaintiff to believe that such waste
or conversion would occur.
(4) Where a woman sues either for a separation from bed
and board, or for a separation of property from her husband, and
has reason to apprehend that he will ruin her dotal property or
waste its fruits and revenues, during the pendency of the action. 3
Dotal property means "that property which the wife brings to the
husband to assist him in bearing the expenses of the marriage set-
tlement."5' Consequently, Article 275 (4) of the Code of Practice
has practically lost its vitality through the disappearance of the
custom of dowry.55
46. Succession of Macheca, 147 La. 164, 84 So. 574 (1920).
47. Copley v. Bonner, 7 La. Ann. 578 (1852).
48. Art. 275 (2), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
49. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Patterson & Co., 130 La. 557, 58 So. 336
(1912).
50. Duncan v. Wise, 39 La. Ann. 74, 6 So. 13 (1887).
51. Ibid.
52. Art. 275 (3), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
53. Art. 275 (4), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
54. Black's Law Dictionary (1933) 614.
55. However, the wife's right to her share of the community seems am-
ply protected by Article 149 of the La. Civil Code of 1870, which authorizes
an inventory and appraisement of the community, and an injunction restrain-
ing the husband from disposing of any part of such property.
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(5) Obsolete. Where a defendant has petitioned for a stay of
proceedings and a meeting of his creditors, and such creditors
fear that he may avail himself of the stay of proceedings to place
the whole or a part of his property out of their reach.55 Again the
matter before the court is whether the facts and circumstances
are such as might reasonably induce the creditors to fear such an
act by the debtor.57
(6) A creditor by special mortgage may sequester the mort-
gaged property, when he apprehends that it will be moved out of
the state before he can have the benefit of his mortgage.5 8 This is
said to be the only case where a writ of sequestration can issue
antecedent to the maturity of the obligation sued on.55 It is a
necessary prerequisite here for the creditor to make oath of the
facts which induced his apprehension concerning the property5° -
for the creditor merely to swear that he fears the removal is in-
sufficient0 1
(7) The plaintiff may obtain a sequestration in all cases
where he has a lien or privilege on the property, upon complying
with the requisites provided by law.62 This apparently contem-
plates both movables and immovables68 The "requisites provided
by law" have been held to be the same as those in Article 275 (6),
i.e., (1) that the plaintiff should have just ground to apprehend
that the property on which he has a privilege will be removed out
of the state before he can have the benefit of the privilege, and
(2) that the plaintiff make oath of the facts which induced his
apprehension.8 ' Only the particular property on which the lien or
privilege exists may be sequestered, and the writ will not issue
where such property has lost its identity. 5 The judgment ren-
dered, if in favor of the plaintiff, should in terms recognize the
56. Art. 275 (5), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
57. Section 5 of Article 275 is for all practical purposes obsolete. The
National Bankruptcy Act [11 U.S.C.A.] supercedes and suspends state in-
solvency laws purporting to discharge a debtor.
58. Art. 275(6), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
59. Egan v. Fush, 46 La. Ann. 474, 15 So. 539 (1894). For a possible ex-
ception, see dicta in Catlett v. Heffner & Likens, 23 La. Ann. 577 (1871), point-
ing out the situation where the privilege exists, even though the principal
obligation sued on is not due.
60. Supra note 58.
61. Bres v. Booth, 1 La. Ann. 307 (1846).
62. Art. 275(7), La. Code of Practice of 1870.
63. Succession of Macheca, 147 La. 164, 84 So. 574 (1920).
64. Sullivan & Phelps v. Koy, 5 Orl. App. 37 (La. App. 1907). This inter-
pretation does not alter the rule that the case in Article 275(6) is the only
instance where the writ may issue antecedent to the maturity of the obli-
gation sued on.
65. Bulloch v. Camp, 167 So. 839 (La. App. 1936).
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existence of the alleged lien or privilege, for a mere personal
judgment has the legal effect of dissolving the sequestration.6 1
(8) Sequestration may issue in all cases where a party fears
that the other will conceal, part with, or dispose of the movable in
his possession during the pendency of the suit, upon complying
with the requisites of the law. 7 This section was an amendment
to the original Article 275, and its sole purpose is said to be to
give the right to the writ when the ownership of a movable in the
possession of the defendant was in dispute. 8 The mere fact that
it is within the defendant's power to conceal, part with, or dispose
of the movable in his possession will justify an affidavit by the
plaintiff 9 This possession need not be physical, but may be either
natural or civil, as long as it is within the defendant's power to
conceal, part with, or dispose of the movable during the suit.
7 °
It is not necessary to have reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant will thus dispose of the movable, but the bare fact that
he has the power to do so will entitle the plaintiff to the writ.7 1
In all cases of legal sequestration the party must bring his
grounds for sequestration within one of the eight categories ex-
pressly authorized by law,72 and in all these instances it will be
noted that (1) he must state that he is the owner of the property
or has a privilege thereon 7 3 and (2) he must allege that the de-
fendant in the writ has either possession or detention of the prop-
erty.7
4
66. American Multigraph Sales Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 11 La. App.
353, 123 So. 358, 360 (1929), holding: "in . . . sequestration cases, . . . a judg-
ment is presumed to cover every phase of the case and, accordingly, where
a judgment is silent upon a particular item of relief demanded by plaintiff,
that silence has the legal effect of rejecting that portion of plaintiff's de-
mand." See also Nalle v. Baird, 30 La. Ann. 1148 (1878).
67. Art. 275(8), La. Code of Practice of 1870. This article covers the as-
sertion of a privilege on movables as well as a claim to a right of possession
to such property. La. Act. 190 of 1912.
68. Succession of Macheca, 147 La. 164, 84 So. 474 (1920).
69. Art. 275.1, Dart's La. Code of Practice (1942); La. Act 190 of 1912, § 1.
70. Blitz v. Guenin, 187 So. 690 (La. App. 1939).
71. Gueydan v. T. P. Ranch Co., 156 La. 397, 100 So. 541 (1924). Prior to
Act 190 of 1912, In order to obtain a sequestration under Article 275(8), it
was necessary to prove the particular grounds which induced the fear that
the defendant would conceal, part with, or dispose of the property in con-
troversy. American Furniture Co. v. Grant-Jung Furniture Co., 50 La. Ann.
931, 24 So. 182 (1898). See Bugea, Lazarus, and Pegues, The Louisiana Legis-
lation of 1940 (1940) 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 98, 147.
72. Art. 275, La. Code of Practice of 1870, § 108. Talamon v. Ytasse, 4 Rob.
462 (La. 1843).
73. Baer v. Kopfler, 19 La. Ann. 194 (1867).
74. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Goldonna Lumber Co., 124 La. 1025, 50 So. 839
(1909). See also Blitz v. Guenin, 187 So. 690 (La. App. 1939).
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The Release or Forthcoming Bond
After the sequestration has been obtained, the defendant may
have it set aside by executing a release bond in favor of the
sheriff, with one good and sufficient surety.7 5 In all cases, whether
the property be movable or immovable7 the amount of the bond
shall be equal to the value of the property released, such value to
be determined by the judge.7 7 The plaintiff's right to object to the
insufficiency of security on release bonds seems now governed by
Act 112 of 1916, which provides a special procedure for this ob-jection, and permits substitution of new, additional, or supple-
mental bond.7s The bond of release is of no force, however, until
the seized property is released by the sheriff.7
Both judicial and legal sequestrations may be released on
bond. 0 The conditions of the forthcoming or release bond, when
the sequestered property is movable, are"' (1) that the defendant
shall not send the property out of the jurisdiction of the court,
(2) that the defendant shall not make an improper use of the
property, 2 and (3) that he will faithfully present the bonded
property 83 after definitive judgment, if he be decreed to restore
75. Art. 279, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
76. Ramos Lumber Co. v. Sanders, 112 La. 614, 36 So. 625 (1904). It is
also immaterial whether the suit be directed against "property" as mentioned
in Article 271, or against "obligations and titles" as mentioned in Article 272.
State ex rel. New Orleans v. Judge, 22 La. Ann. 260 (1870). Rights and inter-
ests of a litigant in a pending lawsuit may be seized. Arts. 268.5-268.9, Dart's
La. Code of Practice (1942); La. Act 85 of 1928.
77. The provision in Article 279 contemplating that the judge shall fix
the amount of the bond is directory to the extent that, where the bond given
is sufficiently large, the omission to apply to the judge is immaterial. Vawter
v. Morgan, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 46 (La. 1827). Where the amount of the release
bond was agreed upon and executed by the parties, the formalities of Article
279 need not be complied with, to make the surety responsible. Coleman v.
Hemler, 1 La. App. 29 (1924).
78. The provision in Article 279 that the "act of surety shall be assigned
by the sheriff to the plaintiff in the same manner as bail bonds" seems obso-
lete in view of Section 1 of Act 112 of 1916, that: "All bonds required by law
or by the order of any court . . . may be made payable to the clerk of such
court, provided that any person in interest can sue upon any bond furnished
in connection with any judicial proceeding without regard to who may be
named in such bond as to obligee...."
79. Ware v. Wilson, 22 La. Ann. 102 (1870).
80. Ramos Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Sanders, 112 La. 614, 36 So. 625 (1904).
81. Art. 280, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
82. Improper use includes non-feasance such as allow rent or liens to
accumulate on the bonded property. Clapp v. Seibrecht, 11 La. Ann. 528
(1856). But decrease in value of property and natural deterioration are not
improper use. Mitchell v. Maxey, 11 La. App. 317, 123 So. 436 (1929).
83. If the defendant is prevented by a fortuitous event or irresistible
force from complying with his obligations under the bond, he is exonerated
from liability. See Strickland v. Winn, 4 La. App. 8 (1926), where a bonded
mule died of a disease known to the equine world as "Blindstaggers."
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it to the plaintiff.84 The sheriff has no authority to accept a re-
lease bond with any conditions other than those above men-
tioned 5 Where an additional stipulation is inserted in the bond,
it will be disregarded;86 and it would seem that these conditions
would by effect of law be written into the bond, whether they are
actually included therein or not.8 7 The sheriff has no right to
make a condition of the bond that the party pay any of the ex-
penses of the sequestration, for the defendant will be liable there-
for only in case judgment is rendered against him.88
The sureties on a bond to release movables cannot be held for
more than the value of the property released. 9 The general rule
is that prima facie, at least, the value of the property is measured
by the amount of the bond. 0 The principal, of course, should be
put in default, and the plaintiff should take the necessary steps
to insure the presentation and delivery of the property.91 More-
over, the surety should be proceeded against directly, and not
summarily by rule or motion.9 2 Where the sequestration of the
movables has been to enforce the lien or privilege, the judgment,
if in favor of the plaintiff, must recognize the privilege, in order
to impose liability on the surety.
93
Where the defendant in sequestration bonds immovables, he
must execute his obligation in favor of the sheriff, in the same
manner and amount as in the release of movables, and give one
good and sufficient surety.9 4 However, the three conditions of the
bond in the release of movables do not obtain in the release of
sequestered immovables. The security is given to prevent the
defendant, while in possession, from wasting the property; and
for the faithful restitution of the fruits that he may have received
since the institution of the suit, or the value thereof, in case the
plaintiff prevails in the main demand.9 It is only where the prop-
84. Art. 280, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
85. Mitchell v. Maxey, 11 La. App. 317, 123 So. 436 (1929).
86. Mulligan v; Vallee, 31 La. Ann. 375 (1879); Baker v. Morrison, 4 La.
Ann. 372 (1849).
87. Goss v. Turner, 149 La. 327, 89 So. 20 (1921).
88. Fink v. Martin, 10 Rob. 147 (La. 1845).
89. Carroll v. Hamilton, 30 La. Ann. 520 (1878); Cf. Howell v. Titus, 7 La.
App. 236 (1927).
90. Mulligan v. Vallee, 31 La. Ann. 375 (1879).
91. Downey v. Kenner, 42 La. Ann. 1129, 8 So. 302 (1890).
92. Colligan v. Benoit, 141 So. 467 (La. App. 1932).
93. American Multigraph Sales Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 11 La. App.
353, 123 So. 358 (1929).
94. Art. 279, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
95. Art. 281, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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erty released is immovable that the law fixes responsibility for
revenues.9 6
The general rule is that the right of the defendant to bond the
sequestration, whether judicial or conventional, of movables or of
immovables, is absolute.9 7 However, there are three exceptions
recognized to this rule: (1) where the defendant is a judicially
declared insolvent,"8 (2) where prior to the defendant's applica-
tion to bond, he has made a cession of his property to his credi-
tors,99 and (3) where the release of the sequestered property
would defeat the purpose of the suit, such as in liquidation, settle-
ment of a partnership, and partition proceedings. 10 0
If the defendant fails to exercise his right to bond the prop-
erty in the manner prescribed within ten days after the sheriff
seizes it, the plaintiff may make bond and take the sequestered
property into his possession. 10 1 After this ten day period has
elapsed, the plaintiff has the better, though notthe exclusive,
right to bond the property. 10 2 The release bond and security
which the plaintiff gives are similar to the release bond and se-
curity required on the defendant, 0 and may be executed by his
agent or his attorney in fact.
The right to bond and take possession has also been extended
to an intervener in certain cases. 0 4 The property must have been
sequestered in his actual or constructive possession, and he must
make a prima facie showing to the court that he is either the bona
fide owner, pledgee, or consignee of such property. The inter-
96. Segassie v. Piernas, 26 La. Ann. 742 (1874).
97. Ramos Lumber Co. v. Sanders, 112 La. 614, 36 So. 625 (1904).
98. Art. 279, La. Code of Practice of 1870; State ex rel. Hyman v. Lewis,
42 La. Ann 847, 8 So. 602 (1890).
99. State ex rel. Simmons v. Theard, 50 La. Ann. 621 (1898). The posses-
sion by the sheriff of the debtor's property, under a writ in a suit pending,
is divested by the cession; the property is transferred to the syndic; and the
suit is arrested. See Art. 2170, 2176, La. Civil Code of 1870.
100. Suit to end indivision in ownership, Interstate Land Co. v. Doyle,
120 La. 46, 44 So. 918 (1907); partnership property, State ex rel. Roth v. Judge,
38 La. Ann. 49 (1886), the partner may not bond the property because, the
effects being those of the partnership and not strictly his, he is not such a
defendant as is contemplated in Article 279; corporation property, Eltring-
ham v. Clarke, 49 La. Ann. 340 (1897), but see statute controlling annullment
or forfeiture of the corporate charter La. Act 124 of 1908, § 2; Dart's Code of
Practice (1942), Art. 309.33.
101. Art. 279, La. Code of Practice 1870. This article originally restricted
the right to bond to the defendant in the suit. Since 1842 the plaintiff has
been allowed the privilege as above stated, and since 1876 an intervener has
the right under certain conditions. See Act of 5th of March, 1842, and La.
Act. 51 of 1876.
102. Hecker v. Bourdette, 121 La. 467, 46 So. 575 (1908).
103. Art 279, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
104. La. Act 51 of 1876 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2140-2143].
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vener may then execute a release bond in the same manner and
amount, within the same delay, and with the same effect as a
bonding by the defendant.105 Another measure of protection
afforded a third party is the third party affidavit, but this remedy
will not necessarily result in the recovery of possession of the se-
questered property by the third party.106 However, if allowed, it
will force the seizing plaintiff to give an indemnity bond in an
amount double the value of the property seized,107 or deliver up
the property to the third party.1 0 8
The Sherifs Return and Administration
After the sheriff has (1) sequestered the property pursuant
to the order of the court and (2) served the petition and the copy
of the order of sequestration on the defendant, he should send his
written return to the clerk of the court which gave the order.10 9
This return should state in what manner the order was executed,
and have annexed to it a true and minute inventory of the prop-
erty sequestered. The inventory should be drawn in the presence
of two witnesses. Where the return of the sheriff contradicts the
recitals on the face of the bond of release, the sheriff's entries will
control.' 0 It is the sheriff's duty to proceed with the inventory
without waiting for a final judgment maintaining the writ of se-
questration.""
In contrast to the procedure in some conservatory writs,"12
the sheriff has a two-fold duty to perform while he retains posses-
sion of sequestered property: a careful keeping'" and a prudent
105. Hardy v. Lemons, 36 La. Ann. 107 (1884).
106. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 3579; La. Act 37 of 1882, § 1; Dart's La.
Code of Practice (1942) Art. 773.1.
107. This remedy is limited to personal property, and the third person
must claim as owner, either personally or in a representative capacity. The
affidavit must state that the party has personal knowledge of the facts, and
that he is the real bona fide owner either personally or in said representa-
tive capacity; and should set forth all the facts on which the title or claim
of ownership is based. Supra note 106.
108. Ibid.
109. Art. 282, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
110. Ware v. Wilson, 22 La. Ann. 102 (1870).
111. Bellau v. Ramsey, 139 La. 983, 72 So. 708 (1916).
112. See comparison of attachment and sequestration in American Na-
tional Bank v. Childs, 49 La. Ann. 1359, 22 So. 384 (1897).
113. If the property is perishable, or subject to loss or deterioration in
value during the suit or before the ordinary formalities of legal sales can be
complied with, the court may order, at plaintiff's request, the immediate sale
of the thing at public auction. Notice of the time and place of the sale must
first be given the defendant in sequestration. No appraisement or advertise--
ment is necessary. The sale shall be for cash to the last and highest bidder,
and the proceeds shall be held by the court until final determination of the
suit or seizure therein. La. Act 195 of 1936, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2154].
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administration.11 4 This power to administer carries with it the
power to contract for the preservation of the property.115 The only
limitation is that his acts be the same as a prudent man would
make under like circumstances.18 The keeping and administra-
tion may be delegated to guardians and overseers, but the sher-
iff's responsibility remains the same. 17
For his administration the sheriff is entitled to a just com-
pensation, to be paid out of the proceeds of the property seques-
tered, if judgment is rendered for the plaintiff and to be charged
as costs against the plaintiff, if he be cast in the suit. It is necessary,
however, to differentiate between expenses necessary to the keep-
ing and administration of the property, and expenses necessary
for the continued operation of the property or inherent by nature
to the property, e. g.-in the case of a sequestered oil well, the or-
dinary expenses of operation. 1-8 In the latter instance the ex-
penses are not taxed as costs, but follow the property itself and
are chargeable to it.
The just compensation paid the sheriff is to be determined by
the court, where not otherwise provided." 9 These charges are the
subject of proof, however, and not of judicial discretion.120 Statu-
tory alterations to the general rule provide that the Sheriff of
Orleans Parish shall collect no other fees than those expressly
Nothing in the act should be construed so as to prevent a party from bond-
ing the property as provided by law.
114. Art. 283, La. Code of Practice of 1870. The sheriff is under no duty,
to insure the property held in his possession. Owens v. Davis, 15 La. Ann. 22(1860). Where a bill of exchange is sequestered, the sheriff should see that It
is presented for payment at maturity, and if not paid, to have it protested
and due notice given to all parties to it. Parish v. Hozey, 17 La. 578 (1841).
If the property should perish, or be destroyed, without any fault or negli-
gence on the part of the sheriff or his agents, there would be no liability for
the loss either to seizing creditors or owners. Owens v.'Davis, supra. As to
the sheriff's duty in regard to perishable property, see relevant statute con-
densed in note 113, supra.
115. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syn. v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 127 La. 971,
54 So. 318 (1910). Although the sheriff, being the executive arm of the court,
should ordinarily obtain special authorization from the court in such cases,
nevertheless, as the law itself confers this power of administration, he may
make contracts for the direct purposes of his administration without such
authorization. Art 283, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
116. Art. 283, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Where the contract is not
such as a prudent man would make, but still for the preservation of the
property, recovery under such contract would be allowed only on quantum
meruit. See Jennings-Heywood Oil Syn. v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 127 La.
971, 54 So. 318 (1910).
117. Art. 283, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
118. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syn. v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 127 La. 971,
54 So. 318 (1910).
119. Art. 283, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
120. Witkouski v. Witkouski, 16 La. Ann. 232 (1861).
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provided for. Hence, where property is kept in the Orleans
Sheriff's custody and a keeper or guardian is required, $3.00 per
diem is allowable, with provision for more keepers according to
the nature of the property. 2 1
Closing Remarks
The writ of sequestration has existed in Louisiana in sub-
stantially its present form since the Code of Practice of 1825.122
The later amendatory statutes have been purposed to broaden the
scope of the remedy rather than to alter or eliminate portions of
the articles themselves. The "jurisprudence" of the court inter-
preting these articles has been notably "constant." These circum-
stances would indicate general approval of the sequestration laws
by the bench, bar, and legislature.
A question which has probably occurred to many a Louisiana
lawyer is why we need three separate and distinct remedies such
as sequestration, attachment, and provisional seizure, with three
totally different sets of detailed rules. It is not difficult to con-
ceive of one remedy covering all three types of cases, with only
such variations in the rules as the type of case may require. Thus,
while no suggestion of change is made as to the sequestration
laws themselves, a definite improvement could be made by devis-
ing one set of rules to cover attachment, provisional seizure, and
sequestration.
HENRY A. MENTZ, JR.
REVERSIONARY INTERESTS IN MINERALS
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently decided two cases,'
Hodges v. Norton and White v. Hodges. These decisions may have
far reaching effects upon the law of oil and gas in Louisiana. It
is to a discussion of these cases and the reversionary interest2 in-
volved that this paper is dedicated.
121. La. Act 136 of 1880, § 23; La. Act 69 of 1922; La. Act 398 of 1938, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1378]. In regard to parishes outside Orleans, La. Act
167 of 1928, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1338] govern, but do not seem to
change the general rule for charges for keeping and administering the prop-
erty set out in Article 283.
122. See 2 Louisiana Legal Archives, Projet of the Code of Practice Of
1825 (1937).
1. Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. (2d) 618 (1942); White v. Hodges,
9 So. (2d) 433 (La. 1942).
2. A reversion has been defined as "the residue of an estate left in the
grantor to commence in possession after the determination of some particular
estate granted out by him." 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests (1936) 59, § 42.
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